The Power of Friendship? Challenges and Opportunities in the Russia-China Relationship
Author: Justin Yates, Stanford Masters in International Policy ’24
Only two countries were explicitly identified as strategic competitors to the United States in its 2022 National Security Strategy: Russia and China. US policymakers are increasingly concerned about the two countries’ growing relationship, as affirmed by the US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Colin Kahl, who said that Russia and China are “more willing to signal this thing is edging towards an alliance as opposed to a superficial partnership.”[1] Improved and sustained Russia-China relations enable the two countries to present a united bloc in opposition to US policies. They also complicate US strategic calculations on “hot-button” issues in areas like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Friendlier relations between Russia and China certainly embolden their leaders and undermine the ability of the US and its allies to oppose their foreign policy decisions.
Russia and China have undeniably gotten closer, but it is important to consider the significant challenges that remain in the relationship. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin claim there is a “no-limits” partnership in the February “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development.” This claim is misleading. China’s actions since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine are a signal of caution, not overwhelming support. The Russia-China relationship is still nowhere near that of an alliance, and there are better ways to gauge how dedicated the two countries are to their relationship than superficial statements. The United States should be cautious of overreacting to perceived Russian-Chinese collusion and focus on monitoring for signals of strengthened relations.
Russia-China Relations
At the Valdai International Discussion Club keynote speech on October 27th, Russian President Vladimir Putin summed up the current state of Russian relations with China, “As for Russian-Chinese relations, they have reached an unprecedented level of openness, mutual trust and effectiveness in recent decades.” This “unprecedented level” has been building steadily since the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit that ended the Sino-Soviet split, and was first codified in the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001. Since then, the two countries have settled their border dispute in 2004, began joint military exercises in 2005, and upgraded their relations for a “new era” in 2019. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin seem to be spearheading increased cooperation from a personal angle, repeatedly referring to each other as “friends.”[2]
The relationship between Russia and China hinges on a mutual consensus that issues like Ukrainian sovereignty, Chinese actions in Xinjiang, and the long-term quest to take over Taiwan remain the internal affairs of both countries. As explained in their February Joint Statement, Russia and China “believe that the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries.” Both countries fear encirclement by western institutions like NATO, the Quad, AUKUS, and other US military alliances.
So far, the relationship has yielded returns. Both countries have increased their participation in joint military exercises, including Vostok 2022 and frequent joint air patrols. China surpassed the Netherlands as Russia’s top market for exports in 2016 and stayed there ever since. On the other side, China uses the relationship to secure its sources of energy. The New York Times reports that Russian trade with China increased by 64% after the invasion of Ukraine, with oil shipments doubling in volume.[3]
In their February Joint Statement, both countries vowed to link Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, intensify cooperation in the Arctic, deepen coordination on artificial intelligence, and strengthen the multilateral organizations of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Of equal importance is both countries’ coordination in the United Nations and other international organizations, where China and Russia often vote together. Notably, CSIS’ ChinaPower project found that “China’s 13 most recent vetoes within the UN Security Council have all aligned with Russian vetoes.”[4]
Challenges in the Relationship
However, these official statements and declarations disguise a long-held mistrust of each other’s priorities. Russian participation in a series of “unequal treaties” that forced China to give concessions to several Western powers is well documented. It is hard to believe that China has fully forgotten Russia’s role in the 19th and early 20th centuries, known in China as the “Century of Humiliation.” Russia is acutely aware of China’s ambitions on the sparsely held Far East territories, the site of previous Soviet-Sino border disputes and increasing Chinese influence. China’s relationship with Russia is a practical one, lacking a legacy of shared history like the US-UK relationship.
Furthermore, Putin’s increased reliance on China since the beginning of his war on Ukraine puts Russia in a weak position with less leverage in the relationship. Russia needs the Chinese energy and commodities market after being shut out of Europe and is essentially financing the war in Ukraine with Chinese trade. China has used this circumstance to secure discounted prices on oil and favorable terms on trade agreements. Regardless of the outcome of the current war, Russia has been weakened politically, economically, and militarily, and its position as a true equal partner to China has declined. Even before the war, Russia was dwarfed by China’s economic prowess and diplomatic presence. Russia’s utility lies in its natural resources, advanced military technology, and opposition to the US, NATO, and the West.
Now, Russia may not be able to provide military support in the event of a Chinese conflict. Though the war has not significantly impacted Russia’s nuclear, cyber, undersea, or electronic warfare prowess, the overall reputation of the Russian armed forces has taken a hit. China’s military technological abilities are surging, and Beijing is less beholden to Russian defense contractors for advanced military technology. China has less and less to learn from the Russian military, which will be saddled by its expenditures in the war on Ukraine for years to come.
China’s delicate diplomatic handling of the war on Ukraine also shows a probable gap in Russian-Chinese coordination. If China truly did not have a warning of the Russian invasion as Putin argues, then there are already apparent limits in the relationship. China has struck a careful balance between supporting Russian rhetoric and refraining from alienating important trading partners in the West. It refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s eastern territories but also abstained on multiple UN votes pertaining to Russia’s actions. We have seen that China has yet to go “all in” on the relationship, and there does not appear to be any rationale for why they should. Moving forward, the onus will be on Russia to prove its worth as a strategic partner to China.
Opportunities for Closer Coordination
Though the utility of the current relationship is limited due to existing challenges, there are certain actions that the US and its allies should watch out for that may indicate a deepening of mutual trust and acceptance between Russia and China. The first, and most obvious, is a military alliance. China traditionally shuns such moves, fearing entanglement in foreign conflicts, but the possibility of such an alliance remains. Any mutual defense treaty or military alliance, like NATO’s Article 5 or the Japan-US security treaty, would seriously alter US strategic calculations.
A related concern is China providing military equipment to Russia, supplying its war in Ukraine. China has thus far refrained from providing equipment or violating existing Western sanctions on Russia. This is because Chinese material support would cement its position on the war, strain other important trade relationships, and risk Western sanctions to signal its support with Russia. Given its high cost, willingness to provide material support would most likely be in exchange for Russian concessions on other important issues. Western observers should continue to monitor Chinese rhetoric on the war on Ukraine, especially if Russia takes escalatory steps. Chinese support in the face of indiscriminate Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure or the use of nuclear or chemical weapons would be extremely notable.
It is in China’s best interest that Vladimir Putin remains at the helm of Russia’s regime, given Xi and Putin’s personal relationship, recent ability to increase joint commitments, and shared interests. If Putin’s power significantly erodes, China may take subtle steps to shore up Putin’s standing or support him in various ways to solidify his grasp of Russia. Western officials should watch out for signals of support to Putin from China, in the form of financial assistance or assistance with quelling internal political disputes. Though unlikely, such support would prove the resilience of the relationship and its potential to deal with much more delicate situations.
Additionally, observers should monitor attempts by Russia and China to offer a legitimate alternative to the SWIFT secure financial messaging service. Sanctioning Russian banks from SWIFT is one of the harshest measures taken on Russia so far, and China can expect similar results if they engage in conflict with the US or Taiwan. Current alternatives to SWIFT include Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). SPFS is primarily used domestically, has a limited number of participating banks, and is a far cry from a credible alternative to SWIFT.[5] China has increased its use of a domestic clearinghouse system called the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), but it still relies on SWIFT. Creating a system that can completely bypass SWIFT and increase utilization of the renminbi is useful for future contingencies and observers should pay close attention to any moves made by China and Russia to create a joint system that might present a credible alternative.
Right now, the Russia-China relationship is facing a test, and largely holding up to it. We can expect coordination on political, economic, and military matters to increase as the two countries oppose the policies of the US and its allies. However, it remains to be seen if the two countries can sufficiently address fissures in the relationship to strategically rival the US.
Justin Yates is a Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy candidate at Stanford, where he specializes in International Security. He is a Knight-Hennessy Scholar and a 2d Lt in the U.S. Air Force. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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[1] Gould, J. “Pentagon: Xi and Putin ‘edging toward an alliance’.” Defense News. November 8, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/11/08/pentagon-xi-and-putin-edging-toward-an-alliance/
[2] Rosenberg, S. “Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping: An increasingly unequal relationship.” BBC News. September 16, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62922747
[3] Lazaro, G and Swanson, A. “How Russia Pays for War.” The New York Times. October 20, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/30/business/economy/russia-trade-ukraine-war.html
[4] China Power Team. “What Are the Key Strengths of the China-Russia Relationship?” China Power. May 5, 2022. Updated August 23, 2022. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-relationship-strengths-benefit/
[5] Eichengreen, B. “Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System.” CSIS Brief. May 20, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/sanctions-swift-and-chinas-cross-border-interbank-payments-system
