Why Japan Needs More Female Voices in Energy Policy-making
Author: Miku Yamada, Stanford Masters in International Policy ’23
The characterization of Japan as a “fossil” in climate change policies is a harsh, but not inaccurate, description. Japan has been a regular recipient of the Fossil of the Day Award, an inglorious award given to “name and shame” countries for not seriously addressing climate change by the Climate Action Network. Last year, at the UN Climate Talks in Glasgow, Japan declined to sign a pact agreeing to phase out coal power, prompting the country to receive this award once again. Such energy policy is largely the result of the strong representation of monolithic, pro-business interests in the policy-making process. Most of the population, especially females who are underrepresented in business and government, are left out of the debate regarding one of the most consequential issues in their lives. Japan must recognize that this is a problem, and take actions to incorporate diverse opinions in this process.
Japan is one of the few developed countries that still has no plan to stop using coal-based power generation. In the sixth Strategic Energy Plan announced in October 2021, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry set a goal to decrease the percentage of coal as a power source from the current 32% to 19% in 2030, while increasing renewables from 18% to 36%. The rationale for its continued use of coal includes its stability as an energy source, as it is not imported from the Middle East, the fact that it can be stored long-term, and its low costs. Instead of pushing forward to phase-out coal, the Japanese government is investing in high efficiency coal, and promoting the narrative that cutting-edge coal power plants are less damaging to the environment.
It is true that energy stability has long been a critical priority for Japan’s energy policy, as Japan is a resource-poor country. This was exacerbated after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident caused the Japanese government to drastically adjust its energy plan to reduce dependence on nuclear power. In fiscal year 2020, the rate of primary energy self-sufficiency was only approximately 11.2%. The argument that Japan needs a diverse range of energy sources and that coal must be one of them goes almost unquestioned in debates around energy policy. Yet, taking a closer look, one can see that the pro-coal rationale is questionable. Japan relies almost entirely on imports for its coal. In 2018, it relied on imports for 99.5% of its coal, from countries such as Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, and Canada. While the sources of coal imports are more diverse and less prone to geopolitical risks than oil, coal is still subject to volatility in supply and prices. Today, as Japan has introduced a phase-out of coal imports from Russia, it is scrambling to secure alternative sources, and suffering from higher coal procurement costs. As renewable energy has become cheaper in Japan, coal no longer has an economic advantage over other sources. As for the promotion of new technologies in coal power plants, even with the latest high-efficiency coal-fired power plant models, CO2 emissions would only be reduced by 20% to 30%, and still emits more than twice as much or more carbon dioxide than LNG plants.
The truth is that the current coal-dependent policy is the result of a centralized policy-making process strongly skewed towards specific large corporate interests. Industrial and energy policy formulation in Japan is largely concentrated in the hands of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Cabinet, and the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). All three have expressed support for the development of large-coal power generation by existing regional power companies.
Keidanren is the voice of big business in Japan, and the nation’s most powerful business lobby. It is represented in all the key groups in METI and the Cabinet where industrial policy is debated. This is a result of the Keidanren being a critical political base for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s ruling party. Keidanren has reinforced its political collaboration with the LDP, especially since the start of Prime Minister Abe’s second term in 2014, and has since urged its member companies and organizations to make political donations every year under the pretext of evaluating each party’s policies. Keidanren also exercises influence over the Ministry of Environment, which is responsible for environmental conservation policies. Last October, then-newly appointed Minister of Environment, Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi remarked that he “wanted to listen carefully to the voices of business” regarding energy policies, and that he would develop “a realistic approach”. The Ministry of Environment also hosts regular meetings with Keidanren to discuss decarbonization. Keidanren is overwhelmingly represented by traditionally emission-heavy sectors like steel, electric power and automotive production, which hampers Japan’s efforts to roll out green transformation plans, according to an August 2020 report by InfluenceMap, a London-based think-tank. In a February 2021 report, Keidanren stated that while decreasing dependency on thermal power generation was an urgent task, thermal power was valuable from the perspective of energy resilience, and that Japan should continue using high-efficiency coal-fired power plants for the time-being, to mitigate impact on industrial competitiveness.
This energy policy-making process dominated by METI, the Cabinet, and the Keidanren, marginalizes smaller businesses and individuals, and as a result, excludes female voices from the policy-making process. Out of the nineteen officers sitting on the board of Keidanren, eighteen are middle-aged men, and only one is female. Only 6% of board seats at Japanese companies are held by women. Disappointingly but unsurprisingly, the legislature and cabinet are no better. The average age of members in Japan’s House of Representatives is 55 years old, and female members make up only an astonishingly low 10%. Within LDP Representatives, it is even lower, at a paltry 7.6%. Of the current Prime Minister Kishida’s 20-member cabinet, only three are women, and to date, there have never been any female Ministers of Economy, Trade and Industry who have served over a month. Finally, not only are the politicians heading METI overwhelmingly male (five out of six), there are zero female officials in the nine high level officials listed under the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, which is the agency within METI developing policies on energy.
Such lack of female representation in the energy policy-making process is problematic for two critical reasons. First of all, it is a problem in itself that this extremely consequential process is dominated by a small group of middle-aged or older men. Climate change impacts women just as much as men, if not more, and women have strong interest in climate policies. In a survey conducted by the Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization in October 2021, 7.1% of male respondents selected coal as one of the energy sources Japan should continue to use, compared to only 1.8% of female respondents. Secondly, increasing female representation will likely lead to more sustainable policies. Many climate NGOs in Japan are led by women, such as Kiko Network, which runs the website Japan Beyond Coal, and whose leader Kimiko Hirata was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2021. Studies also show that underrepresentation of women leads to policies that are detrimental to combatting climate change. A 2019 study examining 91 countries found that increasing women’s representation in national parliaments leads to the adoption of more stringent climate change policies, resulting in lower emissions. A UN report also showed that higher percentages of women on corporate boards positively correlates with the disclosure of carbon emissions information.
If Japan is serious about addressing climate change, and creating a more sustainable and equitable future, it must take proactive measures to include female voices in the energy policy-making process. The first step is recognizing that females are currently underrepresented in this process and that this has negative implications for policies. From there, there are two avenues for change. The first is to increase females within the current policy-making process. The Japanese government had set a target to increase female leaders in politics and corporations to 30% by 2020 in 2003. This was obviously not met, and they revised the goal to reach the 30% goal by as early as possible in this decade. The LDP needs to first increase congresswomen within the party to show that it is serious about this goal, and appoint female politicians to key cabinet roles related to climate change and energy policies. METI should also actively promote female officials to positions that tackle energy policy. Furthermore, the government must set more specific goals to increase women leadership in corporations.
The second is to broaden the current business-dominated process to include more female voices from NGOs, activists, researchers, and companies with a strong focus on sustainability. As mentioned earlier, there are many female leaders working on climate change through various, albeit less traditional ways. METI and the Cabinet Office should invite these leaders to key committees where they discuss energy policy, perhaps by setting a quota of 30% or higher female participation in such groups.
Neither the fact that key players in energy policy are dominated by men, or the fact that businesses have an overly large role in energy policy-making is inevitable. Japan must act now to transform its energy policy-making, and break away from its unfortunate legacy of being a fossil in the fight against climate change.
Miku Yamada is a Master’s in International Policy candidate at Stanford, where she specializes in International Security. She has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, where she worked on wide-ranging issues concerning Japan’s security cooperation with the U.S. Miku holds a bachelor’s degree in Law and Politics from the University of Tokyo.
